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Logic, understood as the study of correct reasoning, and Rhetorics, understood as the study
of persuasive argumentation have been separated fields of research since, at least, Aristotle. This
separation is present throughout the course of history, finding one of its most explicit expositions
in the work of Toulmin [6], along with his criticism of formal logic for being incapable of
modelling the key features of real-life argumentation. In order to fill this gap, several formalisms
have been developed in the last decades, argumentation frameworks [2] (AFs, for short) being
one of the most prominent. Making use of these new tools, logic, specially epistemic logics and
their dynamic extensions, can recover an appealing role in the formal understanding of how
persuasive argumentation unfolds.
Persuasive argumentation among individuals contains, leaving emotions aside, at least three
fundamental components. First, agents involved in a persuasive dialogue have goals i.e. targeted
changes of the opinions of their interlocutors. Second, those agents have beliefs (and sometimes
knowledge) about the knowledge base of their interlocutors (i.e. which arguments they own).
Third, agents use different policies of information change to reach their goals: speakers choose
the information that they share in the different steps of a dialogue (communication policies) and
hearers choose how to incorporate this information into their own knowledge bases (updating
policies). The three ingredients are intertwined in persuasive dialogues. For example, if the
main suspect of a crime is trying to convince the detective, during an interrogation, that she is
innocent (goal), then she will use an alibi only if, according to her beliefs, the detective is not
going to find an easy counterargument for it (communication policy).
Recent works have studied the relations between beliefs and argumentation by combining
epistemic logic and abstract argumentation. They have done so by developing two different
intuitions. The first one is that argumentation is an input for belief ([5] among others); hence
different mechanisms for capturing argument-based belief are discussed. The second one is
that belief is an input for argumentation and, therefore, a tool for epistemic reasoning about
argumentation frameworks is needed (among others, [4]). Persuasion, however, has received
few attention by these approaches. In this talk, we will present a dynamic epistemic logic
for abstract argumentation, suitable for modelling the three relevant ingredients of persuasion
mentioned above. Let us give some details about how each component is modelled.
From an abstract point of view, the content of a debate is representable by an AF: a pair
(A,R) where A is a finite set of abstract arguments and R ⊆ A×A is an attack relation between
them [2]. In this context, the knowledge base of an agent i is modelled as a subgraph (Ai, Ri)
of (A,R), i.e. where Ai ⊆ A and Ri = R ∩ (Ai ×Ai) – assuming that the understanding of the
attack relation is shared, a natural assumption in many contexts and common in the literature.
Goals of argumentation are modelled as intended changes in the justification status of an argu-
ment, with respect to a given AF. Given an AF (A,R) and its subgraphs, acceptable opinions
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can be represented through argument labellings: functions that identify subsets of arguments
that meet certain requirements to be acceptable (usually called solutions or extensions). In
[8], labelling semantics is used to define a notion of fine-grained justification status of an ar-
gument, establishing a position within an acceptance hierarchy for each argument. All these
notions must be encoded in a logical language, in order to reason about them [1]. We do this
by introducing three different sets of propositional variables V := A∪O ∪ I. A is used to talk
about the attack relation, O is used to describe the set of arguments owned by each agent,
and I is used to determine whether each argument belongs to each subset. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first encoding of fine-grained justification status in propositional logic.
Beliefs, and more generally epistemic attitudes, are modelled by defining multi-agent Kripke
models (W, {Ri}i∈Ag, V ) where the elements of W are the possible configurations of a multi-
agent debate, each described by a valuation on V. The agents’ uncertainty among these con-
figurations is captured by the relation Ri and the standard language of epistemic logic suffices
to describe its properties. This is the general idea of one of the logics presented in [4] where,
moreover, a couple of reasonable constraints are imposed on valuations. In the actual setting,
however, some technical problems arise. For instance, we would like the valuation of the el-
ements of I to be uniform (i.e. V (p) = W or V (p) = ∅ for each p ∈ I), for the encoding
mentioned above to make sense throughout all the model. Something analogous happens if we
want to capture the mentioned assumption about sharing the attack relation. We skip this
difficulty by showing that there is a strongly complete logic with respect to the restricted class
of models, without the need of a global modality.
Policies of information change, and more generally dynamic phenomena, are modelled
in our setting by a special application of action models with assignments [7]. The flexibility of
action models allows us to express a wide range of policies. The price of this flexibility is well-
known: doxastic models (where each accessibility relation is serial, transitive and euclidean),
are not closed under action model execution. Moreover, we would also like all the constraints
on the propositional valuations, including those presented in [4], to be maintained after action
model execution. Both problems are solved as follows. First, we show that executing any of
the actions needed for our discussion of persuasion do preserve doxastic accessibility relations.
Second, we give a set of conditions for action models that are sufficient for the constraints on
valuations to be preserved after executing them. In the last part of the presentation, we will
present a complete axiomatisation for the dynamic extension via reduction axioms.
To sum up, the resulting logical framework is enough to give a formal analysis of persuasion
capturing its three ingredients: goals (as targeted changes of the justification status of certain
argument for the interlocutor), epistemic attitudes (as usual in epistemic logic) and policies
of information change (as certain (combination of) action models). By means of this, it is
possible to show, via modelling, the rationale behind a number of communication strategies
that are commony used in persuasive argumentation. There is, however, work to be done yet.
From the different open problems, we highlight the question of how to construct a meaningful
classification of all the definable policies of information change.
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